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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the research question 
 
Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, multiple events happened that are 
considered to be defining for its history. 1967 is regarded as one of its watershed years, as it 
overturned the notion that Israel was a weak country at the mercy of foreign powers. In this 
year, Israel won a war against its neighboring enemies in a mere six days, even though it seemed 
to be headed for disaster in the months leading up to it. This triumph in the Six Day War resulted 
in a wide-spread euphoria among Israeli citizens, not in the least because one of the territories 
that Israel gained was Jerusalem, a city of unsurpassed religious importance for the Jews 
(Gordis, 2016, ch. 12). Both this victory and the resulting euphoria contributed to the rise of 
religious Zionism, a type of Zionism that did not only strive towards a sovereign state for Jews 
to live in, but also propagated that said state explicitly needed to include the land of their 
forefathers: the entire biblical Land of Israel, also known as Eretz Yisrael (Taub, 2010, p. 15). 
The ‘miraculous’ victory led religious Zionists to the conclusion that it was a sign from God 
(Gordis, 2016, ch. 13, para. 3), and could even lead to the redemption of the Jewish people 
during their generation (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, pp. 104-105).  
 In contrast, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 caused the opposite of euphoria in society. 
Although Israel won without civilian casualties (Liebman, 1993, p. 401), the war was 
unexpected and a sign that Israel was not as invincible as it seemed. The Israelis had trusted 
their government and military power, which had let them down. This trust was known as the 
conceptzia, a concept that vanished when it became clear that the Yom Kippur War resulted 
from failure of the ruling Labor government (Gordis, 2016, ch. 14). Israeli society entered a 
crisis and re-examined many of its values after this war, but religious Zionism did not suffer 
from it. The movement did not falter, but instead, increased its influence in Israeli society. For 
example, the settler movements, consisting of religious Zionists who actively tried to redeem 
Eretz Yisrael, began in 1968 but grew large only after 1974 as settlement of the Land became 
a dominant current within religious Zionism (Ariel, 2010, p. 11). Although many Israeli Jews 
feared the effect religious Zionism might have on democracy, the movement grew larger as did 
its influence on the state. For example, Religious Zionists gained many prominent positions in 
the army (Levy, 2014, p. 276), and would be supported by the conservative Likud party, which 
became the largest party in 1977 (Taub, 2010, p. 65). 
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This increase in popularity and influence seems counter-intuitive, especially because the 
initial popularity boost of religious Zionism stemmed from euphoria and self-confidence, 
whereas the Yom Kippur War led to contrasting developments like self-doubt. Moreover, from 
an outsider’s perspective, the Yom Kippur War formed an obstacle to the redemption of the 
people, and shows that the Six Day War was no sign from God after all. Despite this, the 
religious Zionism movement continued to flourish. This is seemingly very contrary to previous 
occurrences, as, opposed to the conceptzia, it was not cast aside. This begs the question of why 
religious Zionism became more popular after the Yom Kippur War instead of fading out of 
existence, like the conceptzia did.  
This thesis argues that the religious Zionists deliberately framed themselves as the new 
generation of pioneers, in contrast to the Labor government which took the blame for the Yom 
Kippur War. Moreover, the religious Zionists downplayed the influence of earthly events on 
redemption, and the movement could therefore survive the setback. Finally, religious Zionism 
was also appealing to secular ethno-nationalists, as they also wanted to keep the territories even 
without religious justifications. However, even after an elaborate analysis, I am unable to prove 
that the religionization of society played a large role in the rise of religious Zionism after the 
Yom Kippur War. 
 
1.2 Methods and Methodology 
 
This thesis employs the historical approach, as it will serve to explain a historical event (the 
popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War) through understanding the causal 
mechanisms behind it. The popularity of religious Zionism had multiple causes, of which most 
have already been studied by previous research, listed in the literature review. However, while 
said research may have looked into certain aspects, none of the papers looked very in-depth 
into the role religion might have played in appealing to followers. This seemed strange to me 
before starting this thesis, as religious Zionism is an inherently religious movement. Therefore, 
this thesis mainly commits to research on the religionization of Israel and whether there was a 
causal relationship between that phenomenon and the rise of religious Zionism. Additionally, 
it reevaluates answers offered previously by authors for my main research question. 
 This research rests partially on primary sources: issues of the newspaper The Jerusalem 
Post, from the years 1972 and 1976; statistics on the religionization of society on an individual 
level; and election advertisements issued by the National Religious Party in 1955 and 1977. 
These will be further elaborated upon in chapter 2. The rest of this research depends on 
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secondary sources. The timeframe of this case study covers the period from the Six Day War 
(1967) to the late 1970s, some years after the Yom Kippur War (1973). Gush Emunim, the most 
significant settler movement at the time, was established in 1974, and would affect Israeli 
politics in the years after (Sharot, 2007, p. 688). As the election results of 1977 show the 
influence that religious Zionism had, (Likud won the elections and allied itself with the 
movement), it is important to include the late 1970s in this analysis. 
As is the case with all historical case studies, the researcher will run into limitations. 
Firstly, there are not many statistics on the religiosity of the society at that time available, as 
the state had not yet committed to in-depth research of the religiosity of different groups in 
society. Therefore, it was necessary to rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, such as 
statistics on religious primary education in comparison to secular education. Secondly, I simply 
did and do not speak Hebrew. This thesis employs a few sources in this language, but I could 
only use them with the help of a translator. As a result, out of the many Israeli newspapers that 
I could have studied for a change in discourse, I had to rely on The Jerusalem Post. This 
newspaper had Anglophone Israelis and Diaspora Jews as its target audience at the time, rather 
than a more representative overview of the population. However, by comparing the ‘Readers’ 
Letters’ section of the Jerusalem Post in different years, one can perceive a considerable change 
in the worries of society, spurred on by national events. It is very plausible that these trends 
existed beyond the Anglophone Israelis as well.  
 
1.3 Conceptual framework 
 
As noted above, this thesis studies the movement of religious Zionism. Religious Zionism 
becoming increasingly popular can be considered a form of religionization, as the secular Labor 
Zionist movement lost terrain in favor of a religious movement, which religionized the 
discourse around certain political issues. It is necessary to explain the concept of religionization 
before engaging with it further, as most of the research in subsequent chapters is centered 
around religionization. Furthermore, this paragraph also provides a brief overview of the 
development of Zionism, and how religious Zionism differs from it. 
 
1.3.1 Religionization  
 
The use of the concept ‘religionization’ by social scientists has been relatively rare: it is mostly 
used by non-native English speakers (Zuckerman et al., 2016, ch. 3 n. 77), and even then mostly 
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in the Israeli context as a translation for the Hebrew term hadata. Hadata was coined only 
recently, as many Israelis feel that the religionization of Israeli society has increased rapidly in 
the last few years (Peri, 2012, p. 1). I shall discuss here both the term ‘religionization’ in general 
and the four manifestations in society that will be studied further in Chapter 2. 
 While the term ‘religionization’ is not synonymous with ‘sacralization’, the two do have 
many similarities. N.J. Demerath III (2007) calls sacralization a dialectically opposing process 
to secularization. Secularization is ‘a process of change by which the sacred gives way to the 
secular, whether in matters of personal faith, institutional practice, or societal power’ (pp. 65-
66). Sacralization is thus:  
 
The process by which the secular becomes sacred or other new forms of the sacred 
emerge, whether in matters of personal fate, institutional practice or political power. 
Sacralization may occur gradually or suddenly, and may also be sometimes temporary 
and occasionally reversible (Demerath III, 2007, p. 66).  
 
This definition describes sacralization as something which can happen gradually, and thus 
rejects the dichotomy that Émile Durkheim once invented. Durkheim stated that the secular and 
profane are radically opposed to one another, as ‘worlds with nothing in common’ (Durkheim, 
1996, p. 36). This distinction would later be refuted by José Casanova, as religions can become 
secularized internally with religious reforms, in the form of de-ritualization (Casanova 2012, p. 
455). The reverse can also happen, as was the case in Israel: the four groups distinguished by 
social scientists are the secular (hiloni), traditional (masorti), religious (dati) and ultra-
Orthodox (haredi). Although the hiloni and masorti claim to be non-observant, they still 
participate in various religious rituals such as lighting Hanukkah candles (Ben-Meir & Kedem, 
1979, p. 359).  
The difference between sacralization and religionization is that the latter is narrower. In 
the words of Zuckerman et al. (2016): ‘Religionization induces people or institutions to adopt 
ideas, identities, symbols or practices generally recognized as religious’ (ch. 3 n. 77). In other 
words, religions themselves can become more sacralized. Religionization, in contrast, only 
happens outwards: it denotes the influence of religions or religious aspects on other phenomena. 
Like sacralization however, it is a process, reversible, and can occur in different ways.  
  What are the phenomena that become religionized? I have separated these in four 
categories, which will be further studied in the second chapter. Firstly, religionization can 
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happen on an individual level. People can adopt religious practices, send their children to 
religious schools, or even become Orthodox themselves.  
Secondly, religionization occurs frequently in correlation to politics. An example is a 
study by Mark Juergensmeyer (1996), who found that political issues in many countries were 
put within a religious context. A political platform in a country with religious nationalism has 
to be compatible with religious goals for it to be acceptable (p. 5). The same was visible in 
Israel during the seventies, when Israel’s claim over the occupied territories became a religious 
question, and even secular political parties invoked religious arguments to support this claim. 
 The third category is discourse in society, which shows some overlap with politics. 
Nonetheless, it will be given its own section, as my research of it is mainly focused on the 
opinions of regular Israelis in The Jerusalem Post. The criteria of whether discourse is 
religionized in this work is whether the people use religiously motivated arguments in debates, 
or whether they express themselves with help of religious symbolism. This does not have to 
concern politics per se.  
 Finally, the state can also be religionized, by using religious symbolism, creating laws 
that support one religion over another or by religionizing institutions (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 
1983). Although Israel does not have an official state religion as of August 2018, it also does 
not have a separation between church and state, like France has (Bellin, 2008, p. 336). As this 
relates to the state institutions themselves instead of to political issues that become religionized, 
this will subsequently also be given its separate category in which I study the military and the 
education system. 
  
1.3.2 Religious Zionism 
 
Religious Zionism relates strongly to the religionization of society, as the assertion of its 
influence can be considered a form of the religionization of society. Religious Zionists 
contributed to the religionization of the political issue of the new territories by encouraging 
others to use religious discourse. This paragraph will describe the brief history of religious 
Zionism, as it did not originate after the Six Day War. It will also describe the debate around 
the terminology used for religious Zionism.  
 Religious Zionism is one of various forms of Zionism that resulted from the original 
secular Zionist movement, founded by Theodor Herzl (1860-1904). He found that the only 
solution to the ‘Jewish Problem’, the marginalized position of Jews in Europe, was for the Jews 
to secure their own sovereign nation (Hertzberg, 1997, pp. 202-203). Herzl considered the 
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Jewish community to be ethnic in character rather than religious (Mignolo, 2014, p. 67), which 
is also why he also considered Uganda and Argentine as alternatives for the location of the 
Jewish state, instead of Eretz Yisrael (Hertzberg, 1997, p. 579).  
 However, many Zionists disagreed about the character of the movement. The core 
definition was still about the struggle of the Jewish people for their own state, but there were 
internal disagreements about how this state should be achieved, and the character of this future 
state. Should it be secular, focused on protecting the Jews from antisemitism, or a religious 
return to the Homeland, focused on hastening the advent of the Messiah? The group that 
supported the latter, the religious Zionists, established an organization called the Mizrachi in 
1902 (which would later become the National Religious Party), and cooperated with secular 
Zionists as long as the new state would uphold the precepts of Judaism (Sharot, 2007, p. 675). 
The religious Zionists should, however, not be confused with the ultra-Orthodox: while many 
ultra-Orthodox Jews are Zionist, many others refuse to acknowledge the state of Israel. They 
consider Zionism to be against God’s will, as He meant for the Jews to live in exile (Horowitz 
& Lissak, 1989, p. 144). 
 Religious Zionism would later go through a change under two rabbis: Avraham Kook 
(1865-1935) and his son Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891-1982). Avraham Kook argued that the state 
of Israel was not merely instrumental for the religious Jews (to provide them with security), but 
imbued with sacred meaning. Even though the secular Jews established the state without 
religious motives, they were inherently holy (‘saints despite themselves’) because God sparked 
them to do so (Sandler, 1996a, p. 3). The most important aspect that the Kooks propagated, 
however, was an optimistic message: the Jewish people were on a one-way track to redemption, 
and had to actively strive towards it (Taub, 2010, p. 39). 
 One watershed moment of religious Zionism came in 1967, the year of the Six Day War. 
Zvi Yehuda Kook gave a speech about how everyone seemed to have forgotten the part of Eretz 
Yisrael outside the state borders. ‘Where is our Jericho? Where is my Jerusalem?’, he asked his 
students. A mere month later, the Israeli Defense Force claimed these areas. As the outcome of 
the Six Day War appeared to fulfill his prophecy, Zvi Yehuda was seen as a prophet (Gordis, 
2016, ch. 12). This ignited a messianic spark in the movement, as their goal was to hasten the 
coming of the Messiah. It also spearheaded the start of the settlement movements, religious 
Zionists who actively built settlements in Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of hastening the 
redemption. Gush Emunim was considered the most important of these movements (Taub, 
2010, pp. 42-43), which is why a large part of the analysis will focus on it. 
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 There are other names for religious Zionism in use. Uri Ram coined the term neo-
Zionism, which he uses for denoting religious Zionism after the Six Day War. He identified a 
large split in the movement after this year, as the war ‘reanimated the old (predominantly right-
wing) creed of Greater Israel’ (Ram, 2011, p. 36). He uses the term ‘neo-Zionism’ pejoratively, 
because he considers religious Zionism a fundamentalist, racist movement. It has the concept 
of a Jewish state at its center, committed to ethnic and religious cultural symbols, instead of a 
democratic state which happens to have Jews as a majority – the latter is at the center of post-
Zionism, which Ram adheres to (p. 35). However, religious Zionism existed a lot earlier than 
1967, and merely became more popular because of the Kooks and the wars. Ram, on the other 
hand, considers neo-Zionism to be a replacement of Labor Zionism (socialist Zionists who tried 
to achieve a Jewish state through working the land), even though the two ideologies had existed 
at the same time before. 
Another term for Religious Zionism is New Zionism, but it has an alternative origin. 
Ofira Seliktar (1983, p. 120) and Lilly Weissbrod (1981, p. 777) use the term not for religious 
Zionism, but rather for a type of Zionism that stemmed from Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s (1880-1940) 
thought and only developed religious components in the 1970s. Jabotinsky, the father of 
Revisionist Zionism, emphasized Jewish nationality and establishment of the Jewish state 
through violent struggle (Seliktar, 1983, p. 121). Seliktar and Weissbrod place Gush Emunim 
in this tradition, rather than in the tradition of religious Zionism. They argue that religion was 
mainly co-opted by New Zionism because it justifies the occupation of the new territories, and 
because religious values are a large part of the Jewish national identity (Weissbrod, 1981, p. 
795). However, they both place the inception of this New Zionism around 1977, when the 
National Religious Party allied itself with the conservative Likud party. This thesis concerns 
religious Zionism, and considers Gush Emunim and other settler movements a continuation of 
religious Zionism. This is not only for clarity, as many other social scientists do the same, but 
I also argue that at least the leadership of the settler movements was inherently religious, rather 
than coopting religion as a national identity. The reason is that they consider the settlement of 
Eretz Yisrael not their final objective, but rather a means to an end to hasten the arrival of the 
Messiah and redeem the Jewish people (Taub, 2010, p. 14). Moreover, Gush Emunim was 
established by Zvi Yehuda’s followers (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 200). The ideology 
of Likud is different, as this political party is not religious itself but allied itself with religious 
Zionists: Likud could indeed be New Zionist (Sandler, 1996b, p. 137).  
 
1.4 Literature review  
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There is a lot of literature on Israeli society and the changes it went through around the wars of 
1967 and 1973. However, said literature does not go deep into the main question of this work. 
Many authors do not think the growing popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur 
War puzzling, or they dedicate a short statement to it and move on. Gadi Taub, for example, 
stated that religious settlers were shaken by the war, but quickly recovered and redoubled their 
efforts to achieve the redemption of the Jewish people (Taub, 2010, p. 52). This does not explain 
why this movement could recover so quickly from this unexpected obstruction to the 
redemption and a negation of Rabbi Avraham Kook’s prophecies. However, there are many 
other authors who offer more thought-out explanations. 
 
1.4.1 Civil Religion 
 
Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983) argued that Israel had transitioned between 
various ‘civil religions’, a concept they define as ‘a symbolic system that provides sacred 
legitimation of the social order’ (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 5). They claim that Israel 
has had three civil religions since the Second Aliya (1904-1914), a wave of immigration from 
the diaspora. Firstly, pre-state Israel had Zionist-Socialism: Jews who moved to Israel were 
united by socialist values in order to redeem the land, whereas Jewish identity had a lower 
priority. Secondly, with the creation of the state, the focus shifted to the state itself: one had to 
be loyal to Israel, and the existence of the state became the symbol to unite the citizens. The 
second civil religion was statism, and the bonds with the diaspora were broken off (Liebman & 
Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 218). Finally, from 1956 onwards the symbol of the state became less 
effective, as the ingathering of exiles was almost complete and the political issues and ethnic 
divisions in the country became visible. Moreover, Israel would go through a crisis of 
legitimacy and soul-searching, mostly around the Six Day War: why would the Jewish state be 
in Palestine? Was it righteous to challenge the Arabs’ right to the land? As religion offered a 
satisfactory answer, the state adopted a ‘New Civil Religion’ which was no longer secular, but 
rather filled with religious symbolism (p. 129). Thus, the religionization of Israel was in part 
instigated by the state system.  
 Liebman’s and Don-Yehiya’s view of the Yom Kippur War is that it was not that 
different from the Six Day War, and both wars had the same effects on religious Zionism. The 
Six Day War was not just a short war followed by euphoria: the weeks of apprehension before 
the war were also important, as these strengthened Jewish solidarity from over the world and 
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subsequently the feeling of the Jewish people against the rest of the world. The trauma of Yom 
Kippur invoked a similar feeling. Moreover, the Yom Kippur War should not be associated 
with just trauma: it was interpreted by the religious Zionists as a reassurance, rather than a 
shattering of the messianism sparked by the Six Day War. It was a consequence of the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Israel, and to many it was a confirmation of the eternal truth: 
the gentiles would always fight against the Jews. The strengthening of the Jewish identity in 
both wars went hand in hand with the strengthening of religion in society (pp. 201-202). Thus, 
the state and the wars both made the growth of religious Zionism possible.  
 Although the reasoning of these authors seems solid, there is room for criticism. Firstly, 
they admit in their introduction that they cannot actually measure civil religion, but rather rely 
on their ‘sense’ that such an integrated symbol system exists (p. 11). Secondly, the authors have 
a very top-down view of the spread of religious symbolism. Civil religion uses religious 
symbols to legitimate the state. Stating that religious symbols were merely instruments to bind 
the people together (p. 136) deprives religious groups of their agency. Instead, the state system 
might have followed a social development of increasing religiosity instead of consciously 
instigating it. The coming chapters will investigate this further. 
 
1.4.2 International factors 
 
Seliktar (1983) presents another convincing argument, although I do disagree with her usage of 
the term New Zionism, as noted before. Seliktar’s argument, later backed up by Shmuel Sandler 
(1996a; 1996b), partly overlaps with Liebman and Don-Yehiya. Israelis increasingly felt that 
the wars between Israel and their neighbors were part of the conflict between Jews and gentiles, 
which is expressed in the Torah: the Jews are ‘a people that shall dwell alone’ (Num. 23:9, 
Jewish Virtual Library Version). The Judaic notion of ‘fused time’ further influenced this view: 
the history of the Jewish people repeats itself and therefore, Jews would always be pariahs 
(Seliktar, 1983, p. 124). Israel becoming an international pariah therefore drove Israelis towards 
religious Zionism. Seliktar and Sandler direct our attention to the international community and 
the renewed interest in the Holocaust, which both contributed to this prevalent opinion that the 
entire world was against Israel.  
Israel found itself increasingly isolated within the global system. Just before the Six Day 
War, France banned all weapons sales to Israel, and the Israelis felt that only the United States 
and the Jewish diaspora still supported them. Part of the post-war euphoria also stemmed from 
this: despite having almost no help from other nations, Israel had won swiftly (Gordis, 2016, 
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ch. 12). The Yom Kippur War, even though Israel had not struck first like before, did not better 
Israel’s image: the United Nations welcomed Yassir Arafat, and most of the world - except the 
US - broke off relations with Israel. In 1975, the UN also ruled in Resolution 3379 that Zionism 
was a form of racism and racial discrimination (Sandler, 1996a, p. 4). The despair that the 
Israelis felt after the Yom Kippur War was thus not shared by the international community, a 
fact which frustrated them. 
In addition, the Adolf Eichmann trial of 1962 ended the silence around the Holocaust, 
and as the years of commemoration and historiography went on, the Israelis identified 
themselves more with the Diaspora, and against the antisemites of other societies. Many Israelis 
felt that the Holocaust was not a German phenomenon, but could happen anywhere (Hever, 
1994, p. 239). Both factors combined strengthened the assumptions of Israeli citizens that they 
could not depend on the gentile nations and had to deal with wars themselves, with help from 
the Diaspora and the United States. This feeling expressed itself in the strengthening of the 
Jewish identity, and support of religious Zionism and movements like Gush Emunim, the 
pioneers of the new generation.  
This reasoning also has its merits, but it once again rests on the association between 
nationalism and religious Zionism. Although Seliktar briefly mentions the religious notion of 
fused time, the emphasis of the two writers lies on the feelings of relative deprivation by the 
international community, which expressed itself in ethno-nationalism (Sandler, 1996b, p. 135), 
and the renewed pioneering spirit of Gush Emunim as an attraction (p. 139). This does not mean 
that their argument is wrong: cases like the Yugoslav wars show that religion is a way to 
strengthen ethnic identities, as Croats found themselves going to church in order to distance 
themselves from the Muslim Bosniaks (Demmers, 2012, p. 35; Christie, 1993, 41:50-42:18). 
However, whereas Liebman and Don-Yehiya hold a functionalist view of religion from the top-
down, Seliktar and Sandler neglect its role in favor of the nationalistic aspect, and prefer to 
view religion as part of the Jewish identity, instead of investigating it on its own merits. This is 
worthy of further examination.  
 
1.4.3 Mizrahim  
 
An aspect that this thesis will not delve deeper into is the relationship between different 
ethnicities within Israel. The so-called ‘Mizrahim’, or ‘Oriental Jews’ immigrated from the 
Middle East, North Africa (also known as Sephardim), India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 
early decades of the state. Even though they have different cultures, all Jews from these 
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countries have been grouped together under the term ‘Orientals’ in order to differentiate them 
from the European Jews, the Ashkenazim (Peres, 1971, p. 1022; Roumani, 1988, p. 423). The 
Mizrahim were economically and socially marginalized in the first decades of the state, which 
resulted in the second generation’s establishment of the Black Panthers protest movement 
(Ram, 2011, p. 63). Moreover, many Mizrahim had a masorti, or ‘traditional’ identity. The 
Ashkenazim were unfamiliar with their idea of religiosity in the early decades, as they used a 
dichotomy between secular and religious. Therefore, the Ashkenazim characterized the masorti 
as religious instead, even though the religious rituals they performed had different meanings 
beyond the Ashkenazi framework (Goldberg, 2013, p. 584).  
 The Mizrahim surprised many political analysts in 1977 when they voted en masse for 
Likud, which contributed to the overthrowing of Labor Zionism. Analysts and sociologists 
would come up with various explanations for their vote. Said explanations ranged from it being 
a protest vote because the Mizrahim felt marginalized, to their relative religiosity compared to 
the predominantly secular Ashkenazim (Shamir & Arian, 1982, pp. 322-324). Some even 
attributed the rise of Gush Emunim in part to the Mizrahim, like Boaz Evron, who claimed that 
the Mizrahim were from pre-political societies and thus did not go through processes of 
secularization (Evron, 1988, p. 381).  
 However, this has already been disproven by other social scientists. As mentioned 
earlier, the masorti identity of many Mizrahim was not understood correctly, and secondly, it 
shows the disdain for the Mizrahim by many Ashkenazim at the time, as they were associated 
with backwardness (Shenhav, 2003, p. 77). Finally, statistics show that despite voting for Likud 
(which would later condone settlement in the territories), the Mizrahim were relatively absent 
from religious Zionist organizations like the National Religious Party or Gush Emunim 
(Roumani, 1988, p. 427). If they had been religious Zionists, they would have been more active 
there. Thus, although the theory of Mizrahi contribution to religious Zionism has been refuted, 
the debate uncovers the underlying prejudices concerning ethnicity and religion. Many West-
European Jews had been secularized, and felt they were more advanced than the non-Western 
Jews.  
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
 
As the section on the Mizrahim shows, there are many inherent prejudices about religion in 
sociology that have only recently started to unravel. The most prominent example is the 
‘secularization theory’, which presumes that the more societies develop, the less they will rely 
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on religion (Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 301). It stems from the works of Max Weber 
(1864-1920), Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), the three founders of 
sociology.  
 Weber attributed the origins of capitalism in northern Europe to the unintended 
consequences of Protestantism. By abandoning the Catholic authority, the lifestyle that the 
people took for granted had been changed. Instead of leaving asceticism to the clergy, they now 
made conscious efforts to be productive and without sin in order to please God (Weber & 
Giddens, 2005, pp. x-xiii). Just like the reduced role of Catholicism had led to rationalization 
in the past, the world would become even more ‘disenchanted’ (Entzauberung der Welt) in the 
future and lead to modernization (p. 178). Marx went even further, and condemned religion as 
the ‘opium of the people’, that prevented them from asserting their own interests (Collins, 2007, 
p. 20). Durkheim, on the other hand, took a functionalist approach to religion, which was also 
apparent in Liebman & Don-Yehiya’s work (1983). Durkheim theorized that God and society 
were one and the same: primitive religions ensured that communities would have a common 
identity (Durkheim, 1995, p. 351). Modern societies have less of a need for religion as social 
cement, as this role has been taken over by the nation-state, which polices the community 
through surveillance and bureaucracy. Therefore, modern societies would have less of a need 
for religion (Bruce, 1996, p. 44). 
Following the work of these founders, sociologists have attributed religiosity to other 
characteristics of the social structure such as social inequality, instead of studying religion in 
an attempt to understand the phenomenon (Wuthnow, 2012, p. 5). This has reduced religion to 
a placeholder for scientific knowledge or something that only persists in vulnerable societies 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 4). However, more recent contributions criticize this view, like 
Talal Asad, who uncovered the normative dimension behind the sociology of religion. Asad 
claims that it comes from a European, Enlightened perspective: the secular was the domain of 
state authority over the public sphere, and as state power grew, the state had an interest in 
secularization of the public sphere and the relocation of religion to the private sphere (Brittain, 
2005, p. 149). That this happened in the West does not mean that privatization of religion is 
necessary for modernity in every country (Asad, 1999, p. 179).  
Israel is a relevant case study for studying public religion in contemporary times: 
Judaism increasingly pervaded the public sphere from the 60s and 70s onward. The sociology 
of religion, on the other hand, is largely Americentric and divides religion into private and 
public spheres, with an underlying assumption that religion is largely located in the private 
sphere. Israeli sociology, in contrast, is more focused on the public dimensions of religion, and 
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sociologists rarely study Israeli Judaism in the private sphere (Kopelowitz & Israel-Shamsian, 
2005, pp. 73-74).  
As religion plays such a large role in Israeli society, it seems peculiar that none of the 
authors from the literature review delve deeper into the role of religionization as an influence 
on religious Zionism. Instead, like many other social scientists at the time, they seem to ‘explain 
away’ religion in favor of nationalism and other factors. The coming chapters analyze whether 
this is indeed the case, or whether religionization was not important after all. As the role of 
religionization seems to be underestimated, I investigate the causes for the persistence of 
religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War through the lens of religionization in Israeli 
society. Moreover, I research whether the works discussed in the literature review still hold up 
despite my criticism. 
 
Chapter 2: Manifestations of Religionization in Israel  
 
The goal of this chapter is to find out whether Israel was religionized during the 60s and 70s, 
and if so, in what ways. It will be done by means of compiling empirical data, primary sources 
and secondary literature. The next chapter will study the implications of these findings for the 
research question, but this chapter will focus only on visible elements of religionization and 
nationalism during the aforementioned period.  
 
2.1 Individual level  
 
2.1.1 Statistics on religiosity 
 
When a secular Jew converts to Judaism, or was already religious but becomes perhaps even 
ultra-Orthodox, that person is religionized on an individual level. Although the focus of this 
research relies on the religionization of society in the public dimension, statistics about 
increasing religiosity of individuals can be illustrative of a larger trend of religionization. 
However, these statistics must be looked at critically. As argued by Yehuda Ben-Meir 
and Peri Kedem (1979), the scale of religiosity cannot accurately be divided into groups of non-
religious, traditional and religious, even if people define themselves as part of one of these 
categories. Indeed, while someone might be religious, this would not necessarily mean that they 
believe everything that is written in the Torah. Ben-Meir and Kedem interviewed a sample 
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group of which 64% believed in God, but only 36% believed in the coming of the Messiah 
(Appendix A, Table 1).  
Three separate researches, by Antonovsky (1963), Arian (1969) and the General and 
Panel Study (1973) were done on a cross-section of urban populations in Israel. The researchers 
asked people whether they considered themselves observant of the mitzvot (commandments). 
In 1963, this was the case for 30 percent, in 1969 for 24 to 26 percent and in 1973 30 percent 
once more (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 173). If these statistics would be taken at face 
value - which they should not - , there is no noticeable ‘religious revival’ from these alone. 
Some other data can give more insight in trends of religiosity in society. Whether parents 
send their children to secular state schools, religious state schools or independent religious 
schools can be seen as an indicator for the parents’ religiosity. The independent religious 
schools were recognized by the state, but were free to pursue an orthodox curriculum focused 
on haredi children that often rejected Zionism, whereas the religious state schools did not reject 
Zionism and still instilled religious values on the children (Goldberg, 2013, p. 586). Table 2 
lists the distribution of primary school students in various years. The relative number of children 
in secular state schools went up between 1953 and 1985, whereas the religious systems noted a 
downward trend. 
Generational differences are also an indication for change in religiosity. Judah Matras 
researched mothers of newborns in his study of 1959 to 1960. He found that around 38% of the 
maternity cases in hospitals of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv considered themselves to be less 
religious than their own mothers, and around 60% just as religious (Matras, 1964, p. 467). 
Simon N. Herman reported similar results in his research of high school students and their 
parents in 1970. He concluded that 42 percent of the students considered themselves less 
religious than their parents, and 51 percent just as religious as their parents. The parents, 
meanwhile, regarded their own parents as more religious than they were (Etzioni-Halevy & 
Shapira, 1977, pp. 173-174). If there were a trend in religiosity in the 1960s and 70s, it would 
have to be towards increased non-observance.  
Demographics could also indicate religiosity, as Mizrahim were considered to be more 
religious, like many Americans who went to Israel for spiritual resolution (Aviad, 1983, pp. 2-
4). However, although there are statistics on immigration from each continent and also 
demographics, it would be over-simplifying matters to characterize these people as based only 
on their continent of origin. As argued in the Literature Review, the Mizrahi ‘religiosity’ was 
founded on an orientalist misinterpretation of traditionalism. To base conclusions on the 
premise that Asian and African Jews were more religious, or that all the Americans who came 
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to Israel after 1967 went there for their religion, would be shortsighted. Therefore, there are 
fewer applicable and relevant statistics about the religiosity of immigrants than would be 
necessary for a well-supported argument.  
  
2.1.2 Statistics on Zionism and Jewish nationalism 
 
From the literature can be concluded that many authors attributed the success of religious 
Zionism to its nationalistic aspects, rather than religious. Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1971) and Oved 
Cohen (1975) found that there was a positive relationship between religiosity and Zionist 
commitment, as religious high school students attributed more importance to the Zionist 
ideology than the non-religious or traditional (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 173). 
Moreover, religious Israelis in 1975 felt more connected to Jewish people in the world than 
non-religious (Table 3). Religiosity was thus linked with Jewish identification.  
 Apart from the relationship between religion and nationalism, the identification with 
Israel and the Jewish people in general increased over time as well. Various surveys conducted 
between 1966 and 1973, collected by Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Rina Shapira (1977) even show 
a direct relationship to the Six Day and Yom Kippur War. Tables 4 and 5 show the aggregation 
of surveys conducted through time. University students felt increasingly Jewish and Israeli over 
the course of three years, as seen in table 4. Moreover, the combined surveys of table 5 show 
changes in mentality before and after the Yom Kippur War, and report an increased 
commitment to Zionism before the war, but also a rapid descent between October 1973 and 
April 1974. Finally, many more people in 1974 wanted to leave Israel than in 1973, right after 
the Yom Kippur war.  
 
2.1.3 Conclusion 
 
Taking all data into consideration, there is no proof of a ‘religious revival’ in the sense that 
Israelis became more religious in the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary: data show either little 
change in religiosity or a downward trend. The statistics on Jewish nationalism are different, 
and clearly show that events of national importance had an effect on national identification: the 
Six Day War aggregated more people to the Zionist ideology, but the Yom Kippur War caused 
a demonstrable dip.  
 
2.2 Politics  
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2.2.1 Knesset election statistics 
 
The most obvious way to measure religionization of politics is to characterize political parties 
as religious or secular, and then compare election results over time in order to show whether 
religious parties had more votes relative to secular parties. However, there are various problems 
with this method, especially in the Israeli case. First of all, religious voters do not just have to 
vote for religious parties, as they might find that a secular party represents their interests better. 
Secondly, party programs never stay constant: parties can change their opinions on issues of 
religiosity, become more or less religionized in an attempt to gather votes, or merge with other 
parties. Moreover, the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) elections of my concern were for the 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Knesset, in the years 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 respectively. 
This did not match up exactly with all the governments, as for instance Golda Meir’s cabinet 
from 1973 resigned after a month and got replaced by a new government under Yitzhak Rabin. 
This shift was unaffected by the elections beforehand, but caused by the report of the Yom 
Kippur War (Gordis, 2016, ch. 14, para. 14).  
 Even so, the election results (Israel, Knesset, 2015) provide a general overview of shifts 
in the political landscape. Based on the results of these four Knesset elections, I calculated the 
percentage of votes for religious parties, of which four were active in this period. The four were 
as follows: the National Religious Party (NRP), which was the party representing religious 
Zionism; Agudat Yisrael, the ultra-Orthodox, non-Zionist party; Po’alei Agudat Yisrael, the 
ultra-Orthodox Worker’s Party; and finally the United Torah Front, which was a temporary 
merger of Agudat Yisrael and Po’alei Agudat Yisrael in 1973.  
 Of the four Knesset elections (Table 6) the amount of votes for religious parties stayed 
relatively constant: they ranged between 12,1 to 14,8 percent of the total amount of votes, with 
the NRP consistently being the largest party. The NRP grew largest in 1969 (9,7%), two years 
after the Six Day War, as did the socialist-Zionist Alignment. Moreover, all of the coalitions 
included at least one religious party. The real shift, also called the ‘Upheaval’, was between the 
Alignment and Likud, as the perpetual opposition member Menachem Begin of Likud finally 
headed the largest party in 1977, and the Alignment lost relevance. This loss of relevance also 
becomes clear from the establishment and instant coalition membership of Dash, the party 
established for the sole purpose of protesting against the Alignment. Apart from this, the base 
statistics of the elections do not say a lot about religionization. 
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2.2.2 Religionization of political issues 
 
According to Mark Juergensmeyer’s ideological approach to religious nationalism, politics 
become religionized by putting ‘political issues and struggles within a sacred context’ 
(Juergensmeyer, 1996, p. 5). Analyses of politics go beyond studying the election results: 
additional sources such as political debates and election posters must also be studied in order 
to show that contemporary issues are indeed placed in a religious context. In Israel, this has 
been happening since the establishment of the state. David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister 
of Israel, used the term ‘Messianic mission’ for the establishment and leadership of the State of 
Israel (Beit-Hallahmi, 1973, p. 239). He was a Labor Zionist, but that did not make him secular 
per se as he was religious in his private life (Ben-Gurion, 1970).  
 From 1967 onwards, politicians used more religious language than before. The cause 
was the greatest question of foreign politics after the Six Day War: whether Israel should keep 
the newly occupied territories, or withdraw its forces from them. There are multiple arguments 
for retaining the territories, like the national-security rationale. One could assert that withdrawal 
would destabilize Israel’s security, which is an argument that became prevalent especially after 
the assassination of Rabin in 1995 (Taub, 2010, p. 100). In the early 1970s, however, secular 
and religious politicians alike would instead invoke religious arguments to keep the territories. 
Deputy Minister Ben-Meir of the NRP called the problem of the territories ‘a Halachic, not a 
political question’, referring to Jewish religious law, and said that giving back the territories 
would be a ‘non-confidence vote in God’. Menachem Begin, who would later become prime 
minister as leader of Likud, stated that as Providence brought the territories into their hands, 
further partitions could not be permitted. Finally, the socialist Ygal Allon said that it would be 
unthinkable that Jews could not settle in the ‘City of Patriarchs’, an alternate name for Hebron 
(Hallahmi, 1973, pp. 237-238). 
   
2.2.3 The National Religious Party 
 
Aside from secularist leaders borrowing religious notions to argue for retaining the territories, 
the NRP became more assertive as well. Because foreign policy post-1967 was focused on a 
religious issue (the occupation of the territories), the NRP became involved in the debate, 
whereas they had been more passive before (Waxman, 2006, p. 40). It can also be attributed to 
the change of guards in the NRP, as the moderate leaders were replaced by a youth faction 
headed by Gush Emunim supporters like Yehuda Ben Meir (Newman, 2005, p. 203). Changes 
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in election posters and advertisements showcase the shift within the party very well. One 
advertisement from either 1955 or 1961 depicts a broom sweeping away unkosher elements 
from society (Appendix B, Image 1). The NRP was then mostly focused on seeking 
compromises with their leftist coalitions about observing religious laws within Israel (Newman, 
2005, p. 203). The acquirement of other parts of Eretz Yisrael transformed the party politics 
incredibly, which is visible in Images 2 and 3 (Appendix B): the adverts were focused on the 
territories and settlements instead, and said that voting for the NRP was necessary to return to 
these lands. As the NRP became more involved in international politics, the debates religionized 
as well.  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, election posters and quotes from politicians uncover considerably more about the 
religionization of politics than election results. The NRP was the largest influence in the 
religionization of politics, but other parties, even secular ones, contributed as well. Politics in 
Israel had never been fully secular, as there had always been a religious party in any coalition 
up to 1974. However, these parties had until then been content with establishing rules of daily 
life, instead of becoming a serious factor in deciding foreign policy, as they became from 1967 
onwards. As they were on the same side as secular factions which also wanted to keep territories 
despite doubting Israel’s legitimacy over them, secular politicians found themselves employing 
religious argumentation and language as well. 
 
2.3 Discourse  
 
This paragraph is based exclusively on my own research on the Jerusalem Post. The archives 
of the University of Amsterdam include volumes of this newspaper of the years 1972 and 1976, 
and I studied a few months of each of these years. The Jerusalem Post made a swing to the right 
in 1989 after interventions by its new owners (Shalev, 2018). In the 1970s, however, the paper 
still supported the governing coalition and included many diverse opinions, though mostly in 
support of Zionism. Its target audience included both the Anglophone (Ashkenazi) Diaspora as 
well as Anglophone Israelis, and both secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews. As 55% of society in 
1976 consisted of Mizrahim (Eliachar, 1976, p. 8), the Jerusalem Post cannot be considered an 
accurate source for the entire society of Israel, but rather of a select few groups. 
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 The trends I was trying to find were twofold: whether religious issues became more 
important than others – judged by the amount of articles dedicated to them – , and whether 
readers from Israel also noticed a change and invoked more religious language, or gave priority 
to nationalism instead. Many debates were, of course, influenced by contemporary events, but 
even with this, these give an insight in the perceived importance of the various issues plaguing 
society. 
 
2.3.1 Events 
 
In early 1972, from January to March, most articles were about economic troubles, in part 
resulting from the large immigration (aliya) from the Soviet Union (Appendix C, Article 1), 
and the social gap between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (Article 2). 1976, by contrast, was very 
different. Emigration became more prominent than immigration, and in November 1975, the 
UN equated Zionism with racism in an official resolution. The reporters of the Post were 
outraged at the accusation (Article 3). Moreover, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, a Holy Place 
for both Jews and Muslims, created tensions. A judge ruled in January 1976 that Jews could 
pray there, which renewed Likud efforts to demonstratively try to pray at the Temple Mount 
(Article 4), despite not being a religious party. Moreover, there were heated debates about the 
recently established movement Gush Emunim and whether it positively or negatively 
influenced society. As more events concerning nationalism and religion took place in 1976, it 
is inevitable that the articles as well as the readers’ letters were more concerned with these 
issues.  
 
2.3.2 Readers’ letters 
 
There are few readers’ letters concerning religion in early 1972: there were not many incidents 
provoking more letters, as in 1976, but some are worth pointing out. One letter (Article 5) is 
especially interesting, as a group of parents talks about settlement of the land before the Yom 
Kippur War, and praises both settlement and conscription as ‘part of observing the Laws of the 
Tora’: the nation and Judaism have shared goals to these parents, and service in the army is thus 
religionized. In the same year, an American immigrant voices his despair that religious Jews in 
Israel might become second-class citizens, as someone was fired for refusing to work on 
Sabbath, and that religious Jews have more rights in the US than in Israel (Article 6). In his 
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eyes, the government does not take religion seriously enough. And, in addition to those two 
specific letters, there were many others about ungrateful immigrants who dared to complain 
about the country, while the previous generation had had a harder time.  
 By contrast, the readers’ letters section from 1976 was filled with heated debates about 
Gush Emunim and the occupied territories. One of these was initiated by Harry Stark (Article 
7), who feared the effects this movement could have on democracy, and is countered by two 
supporters of Gush Emunim, H. Goldman and Eric Graus (Article 8). It is interesting that H. 
Goldman refers to Gush Emunim as a movement also made up of non-observant Jews, and Eric 
Graus uses no religious terminology at all. Instead, Graus uses the word ‘defeatist’ for Israel, a 
word in common use by Gush Emunim in their criticism of the state (Levy, 2014, p. 277; Sivan 
& Friedman, 1990, p. 5). As a result, Gush Emunim is effectively de-religionized by these 
readers, who place focus on their Zionist mission and criticism of others (emigrants and politics) 
instead. By contrast, Saul Sigelschiffer (Article 9) complains that the government uses 
dereligionized terms for the territories: in his opinion, if the government was truly Zionist, it 
would have referred to the ancient territory of Israel, and called the territories ‘redeemed’ rather 
than ‘occupied’, as true Zionism is ‘in accordance with the divine promise.’  
An editorial (Article 10) sums up the social crisis quite accurately: Israel was in a crisis 
of legitimacy, partly influenced by the question about the territories but mostly by the UN 
resolution. The religious Jews were able to deal with this crisis, as their answers to the questions 
plaguing their time came from the Tora, but secular Jews had little to no answers as for why 
Israel needed to be in Palestine, or why they needed to be Jewish in a Jewish state. This mirrors 
Liebman & Don-Yehiya’s argument concerning the reason for the adoption of civil religion: 
only religion could challenge the crisis (p. 129). A debate that ties into this crisis of legitimacy 
concerns the essence of Jewishness: what makes a good Jew, and what Jewish values should 
the country have? Are Jewish values even necessary to the country? Articles 11 and 12 show 
differing opinions: Baruch Sternthal considers knowledge of Jewish traditions mandatory for 
representatives of the state, among which education of the Jewish religion is a large part. By 
contrast, Stark, in a later letter, finds universal human values more important than Jewish ones, 
especially since religious leaders like Gush Emunim’s leader frequently contradict those.  
 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
 
Whereas in 1972 the main concerns of Israel were with economic and social troubles that 
immigration brought, in 1976 Israel was wrestling with its collective identity and values: 
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whether Israel was a religious or secular state, whether Zionism was religious or secular, and 
whether or not they could hold on to the territories. Although Gush Emunim and other settlers 
had a lot of support, there was also a difference in opinion about their goals: had they settled 
Eretz Yisrael out of nationalist or religious considerations? The fine line between this is visible 
in Likud’s attempts to pray at the Temple Mount (Article 4): one of the leaders was a rabbi, but 
many others in the group came without skullcaps of their own in order to assert their influence 
over the Mount. What is certain is that while religious identity was already up for debate in 
1972, it became more central in public discourse in 1976, in both readers’ letters and editorials 
(Article 10 and 12). 
  
2.4 State institutions 
 
One of Liebman & Don-Yehiya’s arguments was that the state system itself incorporated 
religious symbolism in order to ‘serve as a basis for integration, legitimation and mobilization.’ 
(1983, p. 135). The state used religion for its own benefit, in order to unite society. This chapter 
will look for evidence of whether this was the case or not; did the state system become 
religionized, and if so, was it consciously molded from above, or also influenced by the society 
itself? As Liebman & Don-Yehiya study two ‘instruments of socialization’, the Israeli Defense 
Force and the education system, I will re-examine these institutions below. 
 
2.4.1 The Israeli Defense Force 
 
Not long after the establishment of the state, prime minister David Ben-Gurion installed the 
universal draft, and with this, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) became a ‘people’s army’. Its 
function was not only to protect Israel from its neighbors, but its universal draft (including 
women) was instrumental in uniting Israelis from different backgrounds (Cohen, 2016, p. 36). 
The only groups exempted from this draft were religious women and, at the time, an amount of 
400 yeshiva students: haredim who studied in the Torah and Talmud in these rabbinical 
colleges. This was not a large problem at first, as their population was still small (Kaufmann, 
2010, p. 220). However, Ben-Gurion did not expect that the amount of yeshiva students would 
grow so exponentially that in the 1990s as much as 30,000 yeshiva students avoided service and 
relied on state subsidies (Waxman, 2006, p. 133). 
 That a certain amount of haredim did not serve in the army does not mean that the army 
was free of religious influence, though. Before the 1970s, religious recruits tried to avoid 
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combat roles because of their anxiety of secular soldiers who could turn them away from their 
beliefs (Levy, 2014, p. 272). However, religious Zionism brought a change: since the 1970s, 
young conscripts began to see a link between the national mission (the defense of Israel) and 
their religion, and became more enthusiastic about fighting. Two developments were of a large 
influence on this newfound enthusiasm: the acquisition of the new territories, and the Zionist 
project becoming inherently religious according to the Kooks. Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, new institutional arrangements enabled religious conscripts more freedom of 
practicing their religion. The Yeshivot Hesder, a program that combines Talmudic studies with 
military service, has existed since the 1960s, but expanded in the 1970s because the IDF 
required more manpower (p. 276). Religious Zionists could thus combine their religious identity 
with their appreciation for Zionism by fighting for their country while striving towards 
redemption. Their enthusiasm did not stay unnoticed by officers. In a series of interviews in 
1974, all eleven interviewed field officers declared that they would ‘do everything within their 
power to have religious officers assigned to their command’, because said soldiers had both a 
greater commitment to national objectives and a greater appreciation of their significance 
(Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, p. 131). In order to stimulate the amount of religious 
conscripts, the IDF even discussed the character of the military service with the heads of 
yeshivot, and adjusted the service to some of their demands (Levy, 2014, p. 277). 
 As the army’s reliance on religious soldiers grew, so did the influence of rabbis on the 
army: the soldiers were loyal to both their commanders and to the rabbis. This problem of 
autonomy would only be recognized in the 1990s, but in the 70s, it would only be cultivated 
and encouraged by the religious Zionists as a necessary defense of the settlements in the West 
Bank. The IDF needed the rabbis, who could in turn influence their policies (p. 277). The 
religionization of the army was thus both cultivated by the army itself, through creation of the 
Yeshivot Hesder and an increase of freedom of religious conduct, as well as by religious 
Zionists, who instead of dodging the draft began to see the army as a pathway towards 
redemption. 
 
2.4.2 Education 
 
One of the most well-known ways for governments to mold societies is through schools. The 
government can, for instance, instill national values in the new generation through history 
textbooks (Brehm, 2014, p. 319), or force indigenous minorities to adapt to ‘modernity’ and 
consequently wipe out their culture (Barber, 2015). In Israel, both processes were at work. In 
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1963, then minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan, said that the Bedouins should be transformed 
into an urban proletariat through ‘governmental direction’, by making them go to school (Abu-
Saad, 2001, p. 241). While Israeli Arabs had a separate education system sponsored by the state, 
the Jewish children were also subjected to changes. In the early years of the state, when public 
education had not taken form yet, a movement called the Canaanites proposed that Israel should 
discard the Jewish identity altogether. In order to counter these ideas, the government installed 
the Jewish Consciousness Program in 1955, which was designed to instill a Jewish awareness 
into the Israelis in both secular and religious state schools (Rebhun & Waxman, 2005, pp. 315-
316). Here, the word ‘Jewish’ did not just refer to the history of the people, but also to religious 
traditions: children were taught the religious aspects of Jewish holidays and read the Bible as a 
book of prayer instead of as literature. According to the minister of Education, the goal of this 
program was not to convert children, but it was ‘for the national education of the Hebrew nation’ 
(Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983, pp. 171-172). 
As such, religion was a part of the national identity, instilled into society by the 
government. The only education system not part of the state was the independent religious 
system, focused on haredi children, but as Table 2 of Appendix A shows, the importance of 
this system was reduced with time. Although the secular state schools grew, they were not 
strictly secular because of this Jewish Consciousness Program, with an influence on the 
curriculum that has expanded in the decades since its implementation (p. 173).  
 
2.4.3 Conclusion  
 
Both the military and education systems are heavily regulated by the government, which use 
them as tools to not only unite the people, but also to ensure that the values of this government 
spread through society. Liebman and Don-Yehiya’s argument that the state used Judaism as a 
part of its ‘civil religion’, is thus true, though not as one-sided as they say. While the 
religionization of state schools was indeed ‘molded from above’, the IDF was religionized 
because of its reliance on religious Zionists, and the government changed the institutional 
frameworks in the hope to attract more religious soldiers. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed that most of the religionization of society at the time was event-driven, 
heavily influenced by the acquisition of the territories. Although the Israeli people did not 
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become more religious overall, secular politicians would use more religious rhetoric to support 
their arguments, and the NRP, although it did not gain more votes, involved itself more in 
questions of international importance instead of limiting itself to the position of a coalition 
partner. Society started debating the Jewish identity more than before, and used increasingly 
religious rhetoric as well. Finally, the state institutions were also religionized, both by 
regulation from above as well as influences from rabbis. Society was thus indeed religionized, 
in a way that went beyond individual observance. 
However, there was clearly more going on than religionization. Nationalism was on the 
increase as well, as evidenced by surveys and the reader’s section of The Jerusalem Post. 
Followers of Likud prayed at the Temple Mount out of nationalist considerations as well. The 
following chapter will find out whether there is a causal relationship between religionization 
and the increased popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War.  
 
Chapter 3: Analysis  
 
First of all, this analysis is dedicated to critiquing the works written by Liebman & Don-Yehiya 
(1983), Seliktar (1983) and Sandler (1996a; 1996b). As the explanation for the main research 
question is multi-faceted, I will first analyze whether their (non-religious) explanations hold up 
despite my earlier criticisms, by using the evidence collected in the previous chapter to check 
different arguments from their works. Secondly, I will analyze whether religionization 
contributed significantly to the popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War, and 
why it did not fade out of existence like the conceptzia. Thirdly, I will formulate the final 
explanation for the main question at the end of this chapter. 
 
3.1 Analyzing previous literature 
 
3.1.1 Ethno-nationalism and Jewish solidarity 
 
Liebman & Don-Yehiya (1983, pp. 201-202) argued that the period leading up to the Six Day 
War and the Yom Kippur War alike evoked a sense of Jewish solidarity and distinctiveness 
from the gentile nations. Sandler (1996b) also saw the same effect after the Yom Kippur War, 
as the ‘prevalent atmosphere of doubt (…) strengthened ethno-nationalism in Israel and 
prompted the development of Gush Emunim’ (p. 142). Finally, Seliktar (1983, p. 127) argued 
that rather than the Yom Kippur War, a gradual development was responsible for the assertion 
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of the unique position of the Jewish people: the transformation of Israel into an international 
pariah (p. 129) as well as the preoccupation with the Holocaust after the Eichmann trial (p. 
130). One of the tenets of religious Zionism is the belief that the Jewish people are unique 
(Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 117), and religious Jews felt more connected to the Diaspora 
(Appendix A, Table 3). This causal relationship between increased ethno-nationalism and the 
rise of religious Zionism is plausible, especially since more ethno-nationalism in society 
reduced opposition to religious Zionism. Moreover, the alliance between nationalists and 
religious Zionists enabled the latter to assert their influence more (Sandler, 1996b, p. 142). 
 As noted in table 4 and 5 of Appendix A, the identification of Israelis with other Israelis 
and with world Jewry had risen considerably. The change between 1967 and 1977 (provided 
that university students in Tel Aviv are as representative as the group surveyed in 1973) is 
considerable (67% in 1970 to 96% in 1973), but it has to be kept in mind that the ways of 
surveying were different. Moreover, table 5 states that more Israelis felt like they were part of 
the Jewish people than Zionist in both 1973 and 1974. These data are supported by discourse. 
In article 4 of Appendix C, Eli Schweid states that as of 1972, many Israelis felt Zionist instead 
of Jewish instead: their bond with the Diaspora rested on the possibility of aliya (immigration), 
instead of direct identification with Jews outside of Israel. This changed around the Yom Kippur 
War. Article 13 condenses a conversation between army officers a few months before the war. 
They argue that the myth of the Diaspora Jews being of lesser worth than Israelis is untrue: they 
struggled as much as the Israelis did because of the Holocaust and other anti-Semitism, and the 
bond between the two should therefore be restored. This attitude was also visible in politics, 
especially after the 1975 UN resolution had been passed. Yitzhak Rabin organized a conference 
for Jewish Solidarity to improve the bond between the diaspora and Israel, and to unify against 
their ‘enemies’ in the UN (Jerusalem Conference, 1975, p. 47). This conference was different 
than the World Zionist Congress, due to there being a focus on the Jewish identity instead of 
on Zionism.  
 The fact that ethno-nationalism was on the rise is therefore true, as the Israeli society 
was affected by both the Yom Kippur War and other developments. Religious Zionism gained 
at least part of its popularity because of ethnic nationalists, as seen in the last paragraph of 
article 4 (Appendix C): a large amount of the group who wanted to pray at the Temple Mount 
were not religious, but nationalist. For religious Zionists, as well as many nationalists, it was 
unthinkable to give the territories, or ‘liberated territories’, as Gahal and Likud preferred to 
refer to them (Mendilow, 2003, p. 68), away to Arab nations (Beinart, 2012, p. 104). The two 
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camps therefore joined forces, as seen by the decisions the Likud coalition made from 1977 
onwards – the legitimation of settlement beyond the Green Line (Taub, 2010, p. 64). 
 
3.1.2 Labor delegitimation and the pioneering spirit of Gush Emunim 
 
Although parties adhering to the ideology of Labor Zionism had headed the government since 
its inception, 1977 brought ‘the Upheaval’, after which Likud became the largest party instead. 
The authors from the literature review claim that there is a link between this political shift to 
the right, and the popularity of religious Zionism. Seliktar (1983) claims that the legitimacy of 
the Labor government was not only gradually eroded by its mismanagement over the years (p. 
120). Sandler sees the rise of religious Zionism as an effect of its adherents’ assertion that they 
were the new vanguard of Zionism, instead of the Labor movement, which relinquished its 
pioneering spirit when Israel was established (1996a, p. 4). Religious Zionism filled a gap, as 
it had solid ideas while the government seemed to be on the verge of collapsing (1996b, p. 141). 
 The Alignment was re-elected shortly after the Yom Kippur War (before the report 
about the government’s mistakes came out), so its delegitimation was not instantaneous, but 
gradual. Said delegitimation can be divided into three periods: a period of high approval of 
government policy between 1967-70; an intermediate period between 1970-73, and a low 
period from 1973 onwards (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 97-100). The crisis was 
palpable, because even though the Jerusalem Post supported the Alignment at the time, in 1976 
the newspaper included many articles about the crisis in the regime (Appendix C, Article 14). 
Moreover, although Gush Emunim was detested by many, the group had a great number of 
admirers who saw them as selfless pioneers, in contrast to the defeatist and corrupt government 
(Article 8). This was no coincidence, as the settler movement framed itself in that way. In 1980, 
the settlers’ magazine Nekuda stated: ‘the pioneering of the ‘80s does exactly what the Labor 
movement did in the days when it gained its enormous credit’ (Taub, 2010, p. 63). The Labor 
government had since succumbed to indecisiveness and corruption, and the religious Zionists 
represented the new generation. They brought energy back to politics and could renew the 
strength the Israelis had once felt, even if many Israelis saw them as fanatics and a danger to 
democracy (Article 7). My research therefore supports this argument as well.  
 
3.2 The significance of religionization  
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In this paragraph, I will study whether there is a causal relationship between the religionization 
of society and the rise of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War, by analyzing the ways 
the two influenced each other. As correlation does not imply causation, there has to be definitive 
proof to conclude whether this causal relationship exists. 
 
3.2.1 The exploitation of the absence of values 
 
As Liebman & Don-Yehiya claimed (1983, p. 128), the state developed a new, religious civil 
religion after the ingathering of exiles was mostly complete. This civil religion adopted Judaic 
values in order to cope with the crisis of legitimacy that Israel went through after the territories 
were acquired. The Yeshivot Hesder and the Jewish Consciousness Program are clear examples 
of this, even though the latter program had already existed for many years prior to the Six Day 
War. However, apart from state-sponsored initiatives, chapter two showed that society was 
religionized through other means as well, means which were mostly indirectly driven by the 
Six Day War. The issue surrounding the territories were framed as a religious issue by the 
religious Zionists, and as they reformed the NRP from within, the party became more involved 
in debates. The acquisition of the territories also furthered the religionization of discourse by 
politicians of secular and other religious parties alike. As religious language was increasingly 
used in the debate on the central issue of the territories (which later became a question about 
the character of the state in general), civilians, in turn, also started to use increasing amounts of 
religious discourse. Whereas economic issues were deemed more important in 1972, the people 
(or, at the very least the readers and editors of The Jerusalem Post) focused on religious issues 
instead. This was thus not only driven by the religionization of politics, but also by the events 
that caused said politics to become more religionized in the first place. Moreover, the perceived 
absence of values by the Labor government (Article 14) stimulated this debate even further, 
and left a gap for the NRP and settler movements to exploit (Sandler, 1996b, p. 141). 1  
  Sandler argues that religious Zionists were able to exploit this gap because of nationalist 
tendencies and the energy of the movement in contrast to the government (1996a; 1996b). 
However, there might have been another reason. Because religious Zionism was inherently 
religious, many secular Israelis could have been scared off by the radical religious discourse 
Gush Emunim and similar movements used, and branded them as fanatical (Article 7). This 
would have hurt their appeal to the broader secular audience. Therefore, the reception of these 
                                                          
1 Appendix B, Image 3 shows the slogan ‘Alternative of Values’ underneath a NRP advertisement. This is a clear 
stab at the government, as the poster implies that the NRP did have values in contrast to the government.  
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religious arguments mattered as well, which is also where the religionization of society comes 
in. 
 Religious symbolism, themes and discourse can be very effective for social movements 
to gain social influence when applied as answers to contemporary social challenges (Beckford, 
1990, p. 9). This can be the case even if the majority of society is secular, as was the case in 
Israel at the time. However, this saliency is increased if the secular part of society is not 
antagonistic to religious symbolism. If religious elements were already mainstream in society, 
the disparity between religious Zionism and mainstream politics would be smaller, and the 
arguments of the movement thus more salient. 
 
3.2.2 Religionization of religious Zionist discourse 
 
The religionization of society would especially matter because religious Zionists used more 
religious discourse over time (Aran, 1990, p. 168). Instead of utilizing religion to explain 
contemporary events, religious Zionists used contemporary events to validate their 
interpretation of Judaism and to achieve Redemption. However, with the trauma of the Yom 
Kippur War, the contradiction between Zvi Yehuda Kook’s prophecy (that the Jews were on a 
one-way track to redemption) and reality became even greater. Religious Zionists could resolve 
this contradiction in various ways. Firstly, they could do this by attributing the Yom Kippur 
War to the hatred the gentiles had harbored towards them since biblical times, and therefore 
striving more towards redemption despite this reality, like the religious Zionist Rabbi Ephraim 
Tsemel did (Seliktar, 1983, p. 127). This view was easily combined with nationalism, and 
appealed greatly to secular Jews as well. Secondly, the movement could shift the metaphorical 
goalposts of the redemption. Whereas right after the Six Day War, this war had been interpreted 
as proof that redemption was on the way, the Yom Kippur War with its trauma negated this 
view. Therefore, members of Gush Emunim changed the nature of redemption to a ‘cosmic 
event’, and gave more weight to the ‘inner essence of things’, turning away from recent history 
as irrefutable proof (Aran, 1990, p. 168). Thus, apart from becoming more nationalist, religious 
Zionism itself also became more religionized.  
Religious symbolism did become more mainstream within Israel over the years, just as 
Judaism in general gained more leverage over society, despite a decrease in the religiosity of 
individuals. Therefore, there could be a causal relationship between the religionization of 
society and the popularity of religious Zionism.  
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3.2.3 ‘Saints despite themselves’ 
 
However, even though society might have been religionized in a certain way, it does not mean 
that the relations between the observant and non-observant Jews were good. Although the Six 
Day War and Yom Kippur War both had a positive effect on (reported) solidarity between the 
observant and non-observant, it declined immediately afterwards for both parties involved. In 
a collection of surveys by Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, less than half of the people questioned 
between the two wars thought that relations between the observant and non-observant at the 
time were good (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, pp. 190-192).  
A counterargument to this is that religious Zionists do not equal all the observant Jews. 
Most religious Zionists were religious, but there were also many haredim who protested against 
the movement. A notable aspect in which they differed was their acceptance of secular peers. 
The religious Zionists were relatively accepting of secular allies. The haredim, by contrast, 
consciously segregated themselves from the secular part of Israeli society by organizing 
themselves in different neighborhoods, schools and by not serving in the army (Horowitz & 
Lissak, 1989, p. 54).  
Settler movements were relatively open to secular Jews, as long as they strived towards 
the same goal, the redemption. The alliance with Likud fell into this strategy, which stems from 
the teachings of Rabbi Avraham Kook: secular Zionist Jews, even if they did not realize it, were 
inherently holy as their deeds were indirectly instigated by God (‘saints despite themselves’) 
and therefore an alliance with them was not sinful, provided that the religious Zionists led the 
way (Sandler, 1996a, p. 3). Following this line of thinking, the secular settlers could have felt 
more comfortable in allying themselves with religious Zionists, because the latter were not 
antagonistic towards them, on top of the seculars being comfortable with their religious 
language because they had also been religionized beforehand.  
 This did not mean that religious Zionist movements like Gush Emunim were wholly 
inclusive. The alliance with secular Jews was only allowed if these secular Jews supported the 
road to redemption; if not, they were enemies. The adversaries of religious Zionists were thus 
not only the Arabs, but also the Israeli Jews who opposed the occupation of the territories, and 
‘the Left’ in general. The religious Zionists framed their opposition in contrast to themselves: 
the Left lacked values, was materialistic, unpatriotic and individualistic, in contrast to the self-
sacrificial settlers who redeemed the territories for the common good (Taub, 2010, pp. 113-
114). 
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3.2.4 Problematizing the causal relationship 
 
On the other hand, the causal relationship between religionization of society and the rise of 
religious Zionism can still be problematized. The religious Zionists’ acceptance of secular 
supporters meant that the secular supporters could feel the same about the religiosity of religious 
Zionists: they had a common goal, keeping the territories, though for different reasons. The 
religious did so in order to restore the wholeness of Eretz Yisrael, which would lead the people 
closer towards redemption (Taub, 2010, p. 45). The secular settlers did so because they had a 
historical right to the land of their forefathers, and because if enough settlements were to exist, 
it would be harder for the state to evacuate them or to relinquish the territories during peace 
negotiations (Taub, 2010, p. 64). This common goal meant that they could both consider 
themselves to be using the other party for their own purposes.  
 The assertion that religionization was a cause for religious Zionism can be challenged 
further. This is the case because the causation was partially the other way around: religious 
Zionism was in many aspects a cause for religionization. My analysis of social discourse was 
complicated by the fact that only newspapers from the years 1972 and 1976 were available. The 
religionization of discourse I found in 1976 already occurred after Gush Emunim had 
religionized the discussion about the territories. Moreover, the religionization of the army 
happened in the 1970s, in part because religious Zionists made the IDF depend on them so 
much that the commanders adjusted the character of military service to the wishes of rabbis 
(Levy, 2014, p. 277).  
 On top of that, chapter 2 proves that the religionization of society happened in politics, 
social discourse and state institutions, but not on the individual level (although the effects of 
immigration have not been analyzed extensively due to a lack of data). It might have been the 
case that secular supporters of religious Zionism, because of its religious aspects, increasingly 
did so because they were used to more Judaic symbolism than before. However, as seen in the 
readers’ letters of Article 8 (Appendix C), the two supporters of Gush Emunim defended the 
movement with secular arguments when confronted with a critique of its religious fanaticism, 
instead of with religious arguments.2 Moreover, if they did use religious arguments, it is hard 
to prove whether they were secular or religious unless they explicitly stated it. 
When considering the lack of evidence and arguments to the contrary, the research I 
have done is thus unable to provide a final answer on whether the religionization of society was 
                                                          
2 However, they might have kept their audience in mind, knowing that religious arguments would not prove 
Stark’s critique wrong.  
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indeed a cause of the rise of religious Zionism after the Yom Kippur War. Gush Emunim did 
receive more support from the NRP, which granted Gush Emunim a lot of influence in their 
early years (Arnoff, 2018, ch. 4). The NRP became also more actively involved in debates. 
However, this was mostly because the NRP was revolutionized from within by politicians like 
Yehuda Ben Meir, who were religious Zionists themselves. Moreover, it is more likely that the 
secular supporters of Gush Emunim were attracted to the non-religious features of the 
movement and the shared goals, rather than to their religious discourse. 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion  
 
4.1 Answer to the main question 
 
The multicausal explanation of this thesis for the popularity of religious Zionism after the Yom 
Kippur War is largely in line with the literature. After the empirical research done in chapter 2 
and the analysis in chapter 3, I have to conclude that while my research does prove the 
arguments of Liebman & Don-Yehiya (1983), Seliktar (1983), and Sandler (1996a; 1996b), it 
is insufficient for proving that the religionization of society was another cause for the rise of 
the movement. Instead, the failing legitimacy of the Labor government3 and the vitality of Gush 
Emunim and other religious Zionists attracted people to the movement. Secondly, when the 
legitimacy of Israel was in danger, the ideology of Labor Zionism could not counter this crisis, 
but religious Zionism could. Thirdly, the prospect of settling in the territories was easily 
combined with nationalism, and the religious Zionists tolerated secular supporters as long as 
they did not get in the way of redemption.  
 Moreover, in the introduction chapter, I asked why religious Zionism did not falter after 
the Yom Kippur War, even though the conceptzia did and the events of the Yom Kippur War 
seemed to contradict the road to redemption. First of all, the fact that the trust in the government 
shattered explains rather than contradicts the popularity of religious Zionism, as the NRP and 
Gush Emunim made sure to attribute the failure of the security systems to the Labor government 
and to frame themselves as the new generation of pioneers (by which they meant that the old 
generation, the Left, had lost track of their ideals). Moreover, religious Zionists downplayed 
the impact of the Yom Kippur War as an event: they interpreted the war as labor pains on the 
road towards Redemption (Taub, 2010, p. 52) and the significance that they had attributed to 
                                                          
3 This delegitimization was also supported by NRP advertisements. 
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the Six Day War before was replaced by a view of redemption as a cosmic event. Finally, 
religious Zionists as well as Israeli society attributed the Yom Kippur War and the international 
community’s lack of support to the hatred of gentiles. The contemporary state of Israel thus 
seemed to become part of the cyclical continuum of Jewish history (Seliktar, 1983, p. 124), 
which had always led towards redemption as well. Therefore, the Yom Kippur War did not 
counter the view that redemption was nearing; instead, it was, at most, delayed. Although the 
main question seemed to be puzzling, delving deeper into religious Zionism and the effects of 
the Yom Kippur War shows that the rise of religious Zionism was actually a logical 
consequence.  
 
4.2 Implications 
 
Apart from finding out the causes for the popularity of religious Zionism, this thesis had another 
goal: to find out whether religionization contributed to this event, with the help of recent 
literature criticizing the secularization thesis. Chapter 1 criticizes the authors of the literature 
review, by stating that they seemed to ignore religion in favor of other factors, despite Israel 
being so molded by public religion. These authors therefore seemed to either be part of the 
tradition of modernists who argue that secularization is an integral part of modernization, 
something influenced by the normative view of the secular society as an ideal; or of the tradition 
of seeing religion as a purely functionalist phenomenon, the social cement that loses its 
necessity in the modern age. Both views have increasingly been contested since 11 September 
2001, as it showed social scientists that religion was still a decisive factor in the world 
(Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 300), but also in the years beforehand by Casanova and Asad 
(Asad, 1999, p. 178). Because of recent developments of desecularization in many parts of the 
world, the secularization thesis stemming from Weber’s, Marx’s and Durkheim’s work is 
increasingly considered to be outdated. Religion is studied more nowadays as a social 
phenomenon that merits its own attention (Leezenberg & De Vries, 2012, p. 301). Therefore, I 
partially conducted this research because the works of Liebman & Don-Yehiya, Seliktar and 
Sandler seemed to be outdated and were worthy of reexamination. 
 However, contrary to my expectations, it seems that the authors did not ignore religion 
because they felt it was not an important social force in general. Rather, like me, they could 
most likely not find any definitive proof that religionization played a large role in the increasing 
popularity of religious Zionism. Although my research finds that Israeli society did become 
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religionized on an institutional level, political level and in social discourse, I could not find any 
link between said religionization and the popularity of religious Zionism.  
 Therefore, despite not finding this causal relation, my thesis does help in proving the 
secularization thesis wrong, when secularization is understood as ‘a process of change by which 
the sacred gives way to the secular, whether in matters of personal faith, institutional practice, 
or societal power’ (Demerath III, 2007, pp. 65-66). In matters of personal faith, Israel was 
secularized, but the other aspects (institutional practice and societal power) were sacralized 
instead. This religionization happened a long time before 9/11, and therefore, the secularization 
thesis should be tested on other case studies of the twentieth century as well to find out whether 
it once held any merit.  
 
4.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
As discussed earlier in the introduction, I could not study all aspects of Israeli society as in-
depth as I would have wanted. One of the aspects that definitely deserves a closer look is the 
discourse amongst regular Israelis. Although I tried to research the opinions of the society in 
depth through The Jerusalem Post, its reader base is not at all representative for Israel at the 
time, as it only focused on Anglophone Ashkenazim. Moreover, the Special Collection of the 
University of Amsterdam only included a few years, and 1972 and 1976 were the most relevant 
years I could find for my research. Had there been a collection of 1973, 1974 and 1975, this 
might have showed a clearer change in discourse around the Yom Kippur War. Apart from this 
war, a lot of different things happened in the four years in between 1972 and 1976: the 
establishment of Gush Emunim for example, the resignation of Golda Meir’s coalition, and the 
UN resolution condemning Zionism. All these have affected the discourse in their own ways as 
well, and it could have aided my research to study the impact of these events around the time 
when they happened.  
 Although I do not speak Hebrew, I tried to get around it with the help of Jacob 
Mogerman, who offered to translate the NRP advertisements for me. This aided me in the 
research of the change within the NRP, but if I had actually been able to read Hebrew texts 
myself, I could have read much more secondary literature about the Yom Kippur War and the 
rise of religious Zionism that has never been translated into English. I could also have 
broadened my lens of social discourse by studying a wide range of newspapers. Another 
researcher with knowledge of the language can therefore gain more insight in this subject. 
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 A final aspect that I admittedly neglected was the role of aliya (immigration) on the rise 
of Religious Zionism. I briefly discussed that many religious Americans and other Diaspora 
Jews came to Israel to help settle the territories, but as I lacked statistics, it would have been 
irresponsible to base my conclusions on generalizations. The same goes for the Mizrahim, 
Sephardim and ‘Oriental Jews’: they were more religious than secular Israelis with their masorti 
identity, but did not actively contribute to religious Zionism (Roumani, 1988, p. 427). However, 
the large influx of Mizrahim after the establishment of the state did have an impact on the Israeli 
society itself, as the Ashkenazim were no longer the dominant group, clearly visible from the 
Likud victory. As Liebman and Don-Yehiya argued that the government used traditional 
elements from Judaism to bind these groups together, it might also have been more effective to 
the largely non-observant albeit traditional Mizrahim, than to many strictly secular 
Ashkenazim. Moreover, despite religious Zionists being mostly Ashkenazim, the Mizrahim 
might have contributed to the religionization of society without contributing to religious 
Zionism.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Statistics 
 
Table 1: Adherence to certain beliefs of Judaism in ascending order (Ben-Meir & 
Kedem, 1979, p. 357, table 1) [translated from Hebrew] 
 
Sample group of 1530 Israeli Jews in 1979. Question: ‘’Do you believe…’’ 
1. That the soul continues to exist after death?     29% 
2. In the coming of the Messiah?      36% 
3. That something supernatural directs the history of the Jewish People? 47% 
4. That God gave the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai?   56% 
5. That the Jewish people is a Chosen people?     57% 
6. In God ?         64% 
 
Table 2: Primary Education (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 52, table 2)  
The distribution of primary school students by educational stream and year (in percentages)  
 Secular State School Religious State School Independent Religious School 
1953 68,5% 24,5% 7,0% 
1963 64,6% 28,8% 6,6% 
1978 72,9% 21,3% 5,8% 
1985 74,2% 19,9% 5,9% 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Jewish identification by extent of religious observance (Levy & 
Guttman, 1976, p. 44, table 1). 
 Feeling of identification with the Jewish People 
Religiosity Definitely yes Yes No  Total 
Strictly observe all religious 
obligations 
85% 13% 2% 100% 
Observe to a great extent 74% 25% 1% 100% 
Observe somewhat 67% 29% 3% 100% 
Totally unobservant, 
completely secular 
56% 34% 10% 100% 
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Table 4: Israeli Identification and Jewish Identification of Tel Aviv University Students 
(in percentages) (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 165, table 8.3) 
 
 Sample group (1966-1967) 
(shortly before the war) 
The same sample 
group (1969) 
Comparison 
group (1970) 
Strength of 
identification 
Israeli Jewish Israeli Jewish Israeli Jewish 
Strong 90% 56% 96% 66% 97% 67% 
Weak 10% 44% 4% 34% 3% 33% 
N 560 560 560 560 174 174 
 
Table 5: Israeli’s Sense of Belonging to the Jewish People in the World, Commitment to 
Zionism and the Land of Israel, 1970-1975 (in percentages), based on various surveys by 
the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research (Etzioni-Halevy & Shapira, 1977, p. 166, 
table 8.4) 
 
 June-July 
1970 
June-
July 
1971 
August-
September 
1973 
October 
1973 
November 
1973 
March 
1974 
April 
1974 
November 
1974 
April 
1975 
N 1,945 1,770 1,825 400 Unknown Unknown 2,270 Unknown 1,111 
1*          
Yes    96%   90%   
No    4%   10%   
2*          
Yes 77% 84% 82% 90%   79% 80%  
No 23% 16% 18% 10%   21% 20%  
3*          
Yes     5% 16% 13% 14% 9% 
No     95% 89% 87% 86% 91% 
1*: Feels self to be part of the Jewish people of the world 
2*: Views self as a Zionist 
3*: Would like to live in another country if possible 
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Table 6: The results of the Sixth to Ninth Knesset Elections (in percentages) (Israel, 
Knesset, 2015). 
Elections Sixth Knesset Seventh Knesset Eighth Knesset Ninth Knesset 
Date 2-11-1965 28-10-1969 31-12-1973 17-5-1977 
First 
coalition 
after the 
election 
Alignment       36.7% 
NRP                  8.9% 
MAPAM           6.6% 
LAMED-AIN   3.8% 
Po’alei Agudat Yisrael                               
                          1.8% 
KU/SV              3.2% 
Alignment      46.2% 
GAHAL         21.7% 
NRP                 9.7% 
LAMED-AIN  3.2% 
KU/SV            3.5% 
Alignment     39.6% 
NRP                8.3% 
LAMED-AIN 3.6% 
KU/Arab list   2.4% 
 
Likud       33.4% 
Dash        11.6% 
NRP          9.2% 
Agudat Yisrael                                            
                  3.3% 
Largest 
Opposition 
GAHAL          21.3% Agudat Yisrael 3.2% Likud         30.2% 
United Torah Front 
                   3.8% 
Alignment 24.6% 
 
Parties appearing in this diagram: 
Leftist Parties 
Alignment Leftist merger party: in 1965, of MAPAI and Achdut Ha’avoda, 
in 1969, between ILP and MAPAM. 
KU/SV/Arab List Kidmah Ufituah, Shituv Ve’avhav and the Arab List for 
Bedouins and Villagers. Arab Minority Parties associated with 
Mapai, following an initiative of David Ben-Gurion to include 
Israeli Arabs in the government. 
MAPAM   United Worker’s Party 
Center-Right Parties   
Dash Democratic Movement for Change. A protest party against the 
Alignment after the Yom Kippur War, formed by former 
members of the Alignment and Likud. 
GAHAL   Herut-Liberals Bloc. A predecessor of Likud.  
LAMED-AIN   Independent Liberals 
Likud Center Right Alignment. Merger of GAHAL, Free Center, 
National List and the Movement of Greater Israel. 
Religious Parties 
Agudat Yisrael  Orthodox Religious Party 
NRP National Religious Party, the religious Zionist party. Also 
known as Mafdal. 
Po’alei Agudat Yisrael Orthodox Worker’s Party 
United Torah Front   Merger of Po’alei Agudat Yisrael and Agudat Yisrael. 
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Appendix B: NRP Election Advertisements 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Jacob Mogerman for providing me with the 
translations of these three sources. The footnotes contain the translator’s notes. 
 
Image 1: Clean Sweep [Poster] (National Religious Party, either 1955 or 1961)4.  
 
National Religious Party 
HaMizrahi, HaPo’el HaMizrahi, and unaffiliated5 
[sweeping, the Hebrew letter Bet (ב)]6 
[scrap right:] Pigpens 
                                                          
4 1955 is more likely because of the references to the merger parties, but two different sources showed this poster 
with different years. 
5 These parties merged together in 1955 to form the new party. 
6 The party’s election symbol. 
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[scrap left:] Villainy and Non-kosher [food] 
Image 2: A Jewish State [Advertisement] (National Religious Party, 1977a) 
 
[large, right page] A Jewish State 
I will vote in support of Mafdal7 because I fought in support of establishing a Jewish state. I 
want to live in a Jewish state. My aspiration is for my children to live full Jewish lives in their 
country. I do not wish to live in a country like those of non-Jews. I am different than non-
Jews. The Jewish people is different than other peoples, and my land needs to be different 
from other lands. Mafdal is not satisfied with just shouting against absorption, assimilation, 
and intermarriage. The party is active against them. From a love for Israel, from Zionism and 
from Jewish identity. I believe that our nation is not a nation without its Torah. 
[left page] I will vote in support of Mafdal 
Our right to Eretz Yisrael is based in a divine promise, [and] the religious connection between 
Israel8 and the inheritance of their forefathers is what brought about the establishment of the 
                                                          
7 The National Religious Party. 
8 Here referencing Israel as a people, not the modern state. 
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State of Israel. This connection is that which kindled the love and longing for Eretz Yisrael in 
the people in the years of exile. Our right to Eretz Yisrael is not weakened, and it is not 
through the benevolence of non-Jews that we live here. I strive for peace with my neighbors. 
But I will do everything to defend my country and my people’s right to return to their land 
and settle there. I believe in the Covenant: ‘To your seed I have given this Land’9  
[large] Heritage of our Fathers 
 
Image 3: 10 Years. 20 
Settlements! [Advertisement]. 
(National Religious Party, 1977b) 
 
1967-1977. 10 Years, 20 
Settlements! 
Keshet, Yonatan, Argov, Ramat 
Magshimim, Nov, Avnei Eitan, 
Kfar Nagat, Mercaz Hispit, Havan, 
Beit Ramon, Malkhishua, 
Makhulda, Efra, Rosh Tzorim, 
Alon Shabot, Kfar Etzion, Elazar, 
Kfar Darom, Netzer Hazani, Migdal 
Oz.10 
Certainly those that settle Eretz 
Yisrael know to protect its integrity.  
This time, you too can vote ב 11 
Mafdal  
Alternative of Values12  
                                                          
9 Genesis 15:18. 
10 Settlement names from top to bottom. 
11 Bet, the party’s election symbol. 
12 They are the ones with values, and form an alternative to other parties. 
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Appendix C: The Jerusalem Post  
 
Article 1: Excerpts from: Are we still Zionist? (Ben Dor & Reuel, 1972). January 20, p. 
6-7, an interview with multiple experts.13 
 
(…) 
 
(…) 
                                                          
13 Ya’akov Reuel is one of the interviewers, Eli Schweid is an expert on the ideology of Jewish nationalism, and 
Avraham Harman is a former leader of British Zionism and a former ambassador to Washington. 
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Article 2: Israel is a land flowing with problems (Finzi, 1972). March 17, p. 6. 
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Article 3: Israel’s distorted image (Segal, 1976). January 7, p. 8. 
 
  
 56 
Article 4: Police turn back Jewish bid to pray on Temple Mount (Rabinovich, 1976). 
March 8, p. 3. 
  
 57 
Article 5: Reader’s letter: Religious parents urge voluntary service (Ben-Sasoon et al., 
1972). January 14, p. 3. 
 
  
 58 
Article 6: Open letter to Mrs. Golda Meir14 (Weingarten, 1972). January 21, p. 4. 
  
                                                          
14 One sentence is omitted because of my unfamiliarity with the microfilm conversion system.  
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Article 7: Reader’s letter: The dangers of extremism (Stark, 1976a). January 11, p. 8. 
 
 60 
Article 8: Readers’ letters: Replies to ‘The dangers of extremism’ (Goldman & Graus, 
1976). January 16, p. 8. 
  
 61 
Article 9: Reader’s letter: Unfortunate terminology15 (Sigelschiffer, 1976). April 7, p. 8.  
 
                                                          
15 Because of a mistake during the photographing, the bottom sentence is regrettably out of frame. 
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Article 10: Education for Jewish survival (Dolgin, 1976). February 24, p. 8. 
  
 63 
Article 11 (left): Reader’s letter: Jewish education (Sternthal, 1976). May 13, p. 8. 
Article 12 (right): Reader’s letter: Jewish values (Stark, 1976b). October 17, p. 8. 
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Article 13: A state is not enough (Ya’acov, 1976). May 04, p. 8. 
  
 65 
Article 14: A remedy for the body politic (Goel, 1976). March 5, p. 8.
 
 
